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One reason Turner is eager to insist on the possibility of rational dem-
onstration is that he wants the debate between theists and atheists to be 
“capable of being conducted on shared rational grounds” (p. xii). But to 
hold that God can be seen in nature, if one is in the proper moral and 
spiritual condition, is not at all to deny a role for rational argument. Just 
as one oft en has to argue with a friend in order to get him to see something 
that really ought to be obvious, rational argument may be of great help in 
achieving the right state of perceptive awareness regarding nature. (See 
on this point Del Ratzsch, “Perceiving Design” in God and Design, ed. Neil 
Manson [Routledge, 2003], pp. 124–44.) The church fathers certainly were 
not shy in using argument to refute materialist or polytheistic understand-
ings of nature. However, they typically understood their own argument, 
not as a demonstration that God exists, but as a way of explicating nature 
so as to make apparent to our sinful and fallen eyes something that in its 
own nature is perfectly evident. Thus St. Athanasius remarks: “as they tell 
of Phidias the sculptor that his works of art by their symmetry and by the 
proportion of their parts betray Phidias to those who see them although 
he is not there, so by the order of the universe one ought to perceive God 
its maker and artifi cer, even though He be not seen with the bodily eyes” 
(Contra Gentes, chap. 35). One ought to perceive. Certainly there is an impor-
tant role for rational argument here, but it is ultimately no more than that 
of opening the eyes to something that is plainly there.
In sum, it seems to me that Turner’s devotion to Aquinas leads him to 
misconstrue both the nature of apophaticism and the proper goals and 
character of natural theology. Nonetheless, the book oﬀ ers a useful cri-
tique of Scotistic univocity and of many pernicious and irrationalist trends 
in contemporary theology. Anyone who seeks to achieve an authentically 
Christian approach to philosophy will fi nd in it much food for thought.
The Most Real Being: A Biblical and Philosophical Defense of Divine Determinism, 
by J. A. Crabtree. Eugene, Oregon: Gutenberg College Press, 2004. Pp xvii 
& 384. $33.00.
ROBERT AARON JOHNSON, University of Oklahoma
This book is a defense of divine determinism: the doctrine that God 
causes every event to transpire exactly as it does. Chapters one through 
four are intended to introduce and motivate the book’s topics to a non-
philosophical audience. Chapter fi ve is an argument for divine determin-
ism from scripture. The philosophically interesting material starts with 
chapter six. In chapters six and seven, Crabtree argues that divine deter-
minism is implied by creation ex nihilo and that it is implied by divine 
foreknowledge. In chapter eight, he gives a separate philosophical argu-
ment for divine determinism. In chapters nine, ten and eleven, he defends 
divine determinism against the charge that it is inconsistent with human 
free will, that it is inconsistent with divine goodness given the existence 
and extent of evil, and that it undercuts our motivation to be good.
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In chapter six, Crabtree begins his case by arguing that creation ex ni-
hilo can only be understood plausibly in two ways. First, God could be 
understood as a cosmic inventor. According to this model, God has cre-
ated all kinds of diﬀ erent creatures who all operate in exactly the way he 
has programmed them to act (p. 112). Accordingly, there are four possible 
origins of our actions: (a) God controls the actions of his creatures directly 
through remote control, (b) God controls the actions of his creatures 
through pre-programming, (c) God controls the actions of his creatures 
indirectly, mediated through other created causes he designed, or (d) a 
combination or all of the above. Crabtree argues that no matt er which 
option (a–d) one chooses, the divine determination of all cosmic events is 
the necessary result (pp. 134–35).
Second, God could be understood as a cosmic author. Under this model, 
“God’s relationship to the cosmos that we live in is analogous to an author’s 
relationship to a novel he is writing. The unfolding of events of each day, in 
all their details, is the ongoing creation of the story of the cosmos in God’s 
creative imagination. Reality is not like a novel already writt en, sitt ing on 
the shelf. It is a novel being writt en. Each day is the production of the next 
scene in God’s creative imagination, created perfectly in accordance with 
the unchangeable purpose and the fi xed and detailed plot that God has al-
ready determined in his mind” (p. 111). Crabtree argues that this model of 
creation entails divine determinism by defi nition. So Crabtree concludes 
that no matt er how one explains creation ex nihilo—whether through the 
cosmic inventor model or through the cosmic author model—divine de-
terminism follows (p. 141).
In chapter seven, Crabtree argues that exhaustive divine foreknowl-
edge also entails divine determinism. He claims that there are only two 
plausible ways of understanding exhaustive divine foreknowledge: the 
divine disclosure model and the divine clairvoyance model. On the di-
vine clairvoyance model, uncaused or random events can be predicted 
by God’s seeing them before they happen as if they’d already happened. 
Since it takes no position on what causes the event, the model is consistent 
with the denial of divine determinism. Crabtree att acks this position by 
arguing that knowledge of a future event entails that that event is “fi xed” 
as true (p. 156). The divine clairvoyance model—at least of the sort that 
is inconsistent with divine determinism—denies that the future is fi xed 
in any way. So if foreknowledge is possible, the only alternative view, the 
divine disclosure model, must be the case (pp. 156–57). According to the 
divine disclosure model, God predicts events that he will later cause to 
transpire. He knows that they will occur because he knows he will cause 
them to occur that way. In this sense, future events are fi xed in the right 
way for foreknowledge to be possible (pp. 147, 157–58). Since the divine 
disclosure model entails divine determinism and is the only plausible 
model of exhaustive divine foreknowledge, divine foreknowledge entails 
divine determinism (p. 169).
In chapter nine, Crabtree argues that divine determinism is consistent 
with human free will. He fi rst develops an account of human freedom ac-
cording to which a free act is free just in case (a) the act was not the result 
of coercion by means of an overpowering external force; and (b) the act 
was not the result of inviolable laws of nature (construed in the broadest 
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possible sense) operative within the actor herself (p. 214). Second, he distin-
guishes between an ordinary cause and a transcendent cause. An ordinary 
cause is a cause that is a part of created reality. A transcendent cause is any 
cause that exists outside of some specifi c created reality such that it is not 
itself a part of that created reality (pp. 226–27). He argues that since God is 
a transcendent but not an ordinary cause of human action, human freewill 
(per his defi nition) is not violated by divine determinism (p. 231).
In chapter ten, Crabtree argues that divine determinism is consistent 
with God’s goodness given the existence of particular evils and the ex-
tent of evil. He treats the existence of particular evils separately from the 
extent of evil. Concerning the existence of particular evils: Since God is 
not the ordinary cause but the transcendent cause of evil events, he is not 
morally culpable for them (p. 251). Here, as in other parts of the book, 
Crabtree appeals to our intuitions concerning the relationship a human 
author has to the events of his story. Suppose that an author has the char-
acters in his story do evil things or has someone die because of a natural 
disaster. Crabtree thinks that we do not hold the author blameworthy for 
such events. Likewise, we should not hold God blameworthy. That one is 
a transcendent cause is not suﬃ  cient for blame. Since God is the transcen-
dent but not ordinary cause of evil, God is not responsible for particular 
evils (p. 252). Now, concerning the extent of evil: We can judge a human 
author blameworthy if, say, the novel is just trash. But we don’t know if 
God’s story is of that sort—at least not yet. At present, we do not know 
how the complete story unveils. We don’t know God’s motives behind the 
story, the purposes it accomplishes, and the fi nal eﬀ ect it has. Crabtree 
suggests that the extent of evil can be vindicated in the fi nal analysis, if the 
story unfolds in the right way. At least this possibility is open. Thus, given 
our present knowledge, we cannot pass judgment on God because of the 
extent of evil (p. 253).
In chapter eleven, Crabtree argues that divine determinism does not un-
dercut our motivation to be good. The objection he has in mind is that if 
God causes events to transpire in a certain way, then we have no motiva-
tion to be good, since if God wills us to be good, we will be good. Crabtree 
responds to this objection by arguing that our motive to be good is neces-
sary for a good act to occur (p. 277). Again, every event in the story needs 
an ordinary cause. Our good actions are caused by our own volition and 
motives. By contrast, God is the transcendent cause. He ensures that our 
acts follow according to his plan. But he doesn’t force us by ordinary causes 
to do good things. Thus we shouldn’t think that God forces us to do good 
if he wills it. We should, though, think our motivation to do good plays a 
necessary role in our doing good actions. So our motivation to do good is 
not undercut by divine determinism (p. 275).
In my judgment, Crabtree is mistaken in thinking that the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo and the doctrine of exhaustive foreknowledge each en-
tails divine determinism. Someone could hold just to one doctrine while 
denying the other and escape the conclusion that divine determinism 
must be the case. For example, one could take the position that God cre-
ates everything out of nothing, wants people to be good, but can’t control 
the actions of anyone. The future is not fi xed, and thus every action has 
alternate possibilities. This is similar to the theology of Bruce Almighty. 
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Such a position embraces creation ex nihilo, but doesn’t require divine de-
terminism. Instead, it denies divine determinism because it denies that 
God causes every event to happen just the way it does. In fact, God can’t 
cause events caused by human action and can’t even in principle know 
what they will be. Just the possibility of this position undercuts Crabtree’s 
thesis that creation ex nihilo by itself entails divine determinism.
Furthermore, suppose that someone holds to exhaustive divine fore-
knowledge but denies creation ex nihilo. For example, suppose someone 
holds that God did not create anything and has no causal power over the 
world, but can see into the future because he has complete knowledge of 
the present along with knowledge of all of the natural and physical laws. 
On this picture, the future is fi xed; but it is fi xed in the way that determin-
ists hold it to be fi xed. Accordingly, God’s knowing something will be the 
case does not entail that He causes that thing to be the case. So exhaustive 
foreknowledge is not suﬃ  cient to entail divine determinism.
How well does Crabtree fare with the objections he considers? Concern-
ing the free will objection (chapter nine), his move is plausible and promis-
ing. He develops an incompatibilist theory of free will that requires agent 
causation for freedom and that does not require the principle of alternate 
possibilities (PAP). God is a super-cause of every event but humans cause 
their own actions. Alternate possibilities of action are taken out by fore-
knowledge, but freedom does not require PAP. This move resembles what 
Zagzebski calls the Augustinian-Frankfurtian solution to the freedom and 
foreknowledge dilemma, and supplies ample resistance to Lynne Baker’s 
plea that Christians reject libertarianism on the basis of creation ex nihilo 
and foreknowledge.1
How he handles the problem of particular evils is promising, but still 
invites a problem. According to Crabtree, God escapes blame for particu-
lar evils because He is not the ordinary cause of bad events. Still, God 
“writes himself into the story as Yahweh-the-Judge (YTJ) to get credit for 
good events” (p. 253). So God can be the ordinary cause of some events. 
But if He can be the ordinary cause of good events, He can be the ordinary 
cause of bad events. YTJ’s hardening Pharaoh’s heart is an example of His 
being the ordinary cause of a bad event. YTJ hardened Pharaoh’s heart 
and then punished Egypt because Pharaoh would not let the Israelites go. 
On Crabtree’s defi nition of free will, Pharaoh did not perform a free act, 
since YTJ acted as an overpowering external force. So it looks like Crabtree 
is committ ed to saying YTJ gets credit for this bad event. And worse, God 
intentionally wrote Himself into the story to get credit for this bad event.
This book was writt en for lay evangelicals, seminarians, and pastors. 
However, it should be interesting for professional philosophers and grad-
uate students working on the problem of evil, divine foreknowledge/
freedom, and philosophical theology.
NOTES
1. See Linda Zagzebski, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Lynne Rudder Baker, “Why Christians 
Should Not Be Libertarians: An Augustinian Challenge,” Faith and Philosophy 20 
no.4: 460–68.
